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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
MELVIN JEREMY SAVAGE,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43474
BONNEVILLE COUNTY NO. CR 2014-16735
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Melvin Savage appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion
when it imposed and executed his sentence in this case. He asserts that, by executing
his sentence, the district court failed to adequately consider the fact that imprisonment
was not needed to protect society, given Mr. Savage’s overall character, and the fact
that effective rehabilitation would be best achieved if treatment occurred in the
community. He also contends the district court abused its discretion by not further
reducing his sentence (it took one year off his nineteen-year unified sentence) or
retaining jurisdiction pursuant to his I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion for similar
reasons.

For either reason, this Court should reduce Mr. Savage’s sentence as it
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deems appropriate, or, alternatively, remand this case to the district court for a new
sentencing determination.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Savage had been building a successful life with his wife and two children.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.14). He had a good job as a real
estate appraiser. (See, e.g., Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), Part
1, p.151; Defendant’s Sentencing Exhibit B (Mr. Savage’s resume).)2 He has a degree
in business administration. (PSI, Part 1, pp.14-15) He had a good reputation in the
community. (See PSI, Part 2, pp.68-78.) He had lived forty-four years without legal
trouble. (See PSI, pp.1, 22.) However, he was also struggling with alcohol abuse.
(See, e.g., Sentencing Tr., p.13.)3 It impacted on his family life. (See, e.g., PSI, Part 2,
pp.75, 78.)

Unfortunately, he did not appreciate the full scope of those issues.

(Defendant’s Sentencing Exhibit A, p.2.) The result was, despite his efforts to deal with

“PSI, Part 1” page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF
file “PSI.” Included in this file are the PSI report and some of the documents attached
thereto. However, other documents, such as the GAIN-I evaluation, substance abuse
evaluation, and mental health evaluation are included in a separate PDF file,
“Defendant’s Criminal Record,” which will be identified as “PSI, Part 2.”
2 Mr. Savage presented exhibits (each of which is provided in a separate PDF file) at his
sentencing hearing and the hearing on his Rule 35 motion, two of which are identified
as “Defendant’s Exhibit A.” To avoid confusion, “Defendant’s Exhibit A Psychological
Evaluation dated April 15, 2015,” will be referred to as “Defendant’s Sentencing Exhibit
A.” Similarly, “Defendant’s Exhibit A Memorandum dated August 10, 2015 will be
referred to as “Defendant’s Rule 35 Exhibit A,” and “Defendant’s Exhibit B,” will be
referred to as “Defendant’s Rule 35 Exhibit B.”
3 The transcripts in this case were provided in three independently bound and paginated
volumes. Only the volumes containing the transcripts of the sentencing hearing and the
Rule 35 motion hearing are cited herein, and will be identified accordingly. The
transcript of the sentencing hearing does not provide line numbers.
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those issues by seeking treatment, (see, e.g., PSI, Part 1, p.17), his marriage fell apart.
(See, e.g., PSI, Part 2, pp.70-71.)
The ensuing divorce proceedings became emotionally-charged. (See PSI, Part
1, p.14 (Mr. Savage explaining that the tenor of the divorce proceedings changed when
his wife accused him of adultery, cruelty, and irreconcilable differences as the bases for
seeking the divorce).) Mr. Savage did not believe his wife was driving those tactical
choices, and so, began to display animosity toward his wife’s attorney. (PSI, Part 1,
pp.8-9; see also Sentencing Tr., p.59 (“Perhaps subconsciously he didn’t want to blame
his wife for what was happening. Maybe he didn’t want to take blame himself for what
was happening. And he turned to [his wife’s attorney].”).) As a result of the growing
stress in the divorce proceedings, Mr. Savage began suffering from adjustment disorder
with depressed mood, which resulted in a change in his functioning and behavior.
(See Sentencing Tr., p.13; see also Sentencing Tr., p.59 (discussing Mr. Savage’s
behavior during the divorce proceedings).) Mr. Savage did not have the skill level to
appropriately deal with that condition or the underlying stressors which triggered it.
(Sentencing Tr., p.16.) The result was a series of encounters between Mr. Savage and
his wife’s attorney and her husband, culminating with Mr. Savage setting fire to a gas
can near their house, which then ignited part of the house. (See, e.g., PSI, Part 1, p.4.)
Fortunately, the wife’s attorney and her husband were able to evacuate their
family from the house and “[e]mergency responders were able to put out the fire with a
fire extinguisher.” (PSI, Part 1, pp.4, 49-50; see also Sentencing Tr., pp.50-51 (urging
the district court to set aside the hyperbole and speculation in the victim impact
statements and prosecutor’s arguments about what could have happened or might have

3

happened and sentence Mr. Savage based on what actually happened).) Meanwhile,
Mr. Savage, who had been burned during the incident, had driven to Colorado. (PSI,
Part 1, pp.5, 9.) Once there, he realized the impact of what he had done and started to
head back, when he was ultimately arrested. (Sentencing Tr., p.60; compare PSI, p.5.)
He expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his actions. (PSI, Part 1, p.18;
Sentencing Tr., pp.75-76; see also Sentencing Tr., pp.11-12 (psychologist testifying that
evaluations of Mr. Savage verify his self-reports are honest).)
As a result, Mr. Savage pled guilty to charges of arson and misdemeanor
stalking.

(R., p.43.)4

In exchange, the State agreed to not file additional charges

related to these events, dismiss two other misdemeanor cases, and recommend
concurrent sentences. (R., p.43.) Mr. Savage also agreed to pay reasonable restitution
for all the charged and uncharged conduct. (R., p.44; see also Sentencing Tr., p.49
(defense counsel not objecting to the restitution request ultimately filed by the
prosecutor).)

The district court ordered a psychological evaluation as part of the

presentence process. (R., pp.61-62.)
At sentencing, the doctor who performed that evaluation, Dr. John Landers, was
called to testify as to the nature and impact of Mr. Savage’s mental health issues on his
actions, as well as his prognosis for dealing with such issues in the future. Dr. Landers
explained that Mr. Savage’s actions in this case were the result of his adjustment
disorder, and the normal way to treat that disorder would be to remove the underlying
stressor.

(Sentencing Tr., p.13.)

Defense counsel pointed out that has already

The page numbers from the electronic PDF of the Record do not correspond to the
page numbers appearing in the lower right corner of the record pages. Citations to the
record in this brief refer to the PDF page numbers.
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happened. (Sentencing Tr., p.61.) As such, Dr. Landers explained this was an isolated
event caused by the unique set of circumstances that existed at that time. (Sentencing
Tr., p.15.) Therefore, he concluded the risk Mr. Savage presented “to others is low at
this time, including toward those harmed by his previous actions.”

(Defendant’s

Sentencing Exhibit A, p.2; cf. Sentencing Tr., p.17.) To that point, Mr. Savage scored
12 on the LSI evaluation, which also indicates he presents a low risk to reoffend.5
(PSI, Part 1, p.21.)
However, Dr. Landers also noted that, if Mr. Savage were to continue using
alcohol, that prognosis might change. (Defendant’s Sentencing Exhibit A, p.2.) As such,
Dr. Landers recommended Mr. Savage receive treatment for his alcohol issues.
(Defendant’s Sentencing Exhibit A, p.4) He specifically recommended that treatment be
undertaken in the community so as to allow Mr. Savage the opportunity to apply the
lessons in a practical setting, where the stressors which might trigger an episode would
be present and, thus, appropriately managed. (Sentencing Tr., pp.21-22.) Without that
practical component, the doctor testified the treatment was not likely to be successful:
“it is unlikely that time served in and of itself will create the adaptive coping skills and
insight necessary to become a productive member of society with a recognition of and
investment in social norms, ethics, and moral behavior once returned to the
community.”

(Defendant’s Sentencing Exhibit A, p.4; Sentencing Tr., pp.25-26.)

Dr. Landers also explained that even the federal prisons, which are the best funded in

As defense counsel explained, the PSI investigator’s subsequent conclusion that
Mr. Savage presented a “real danger to the community” (PSI, Part 1, p.23), ignored the
LSI score and failed to incorporate the information from the court-ordered psychological
evaluation. (Sentencing Tr., p.52.)
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regard to programming, do not provide a lot of the necessary treatment, particularly
when compared with their community-based counterparts. (Sentencing Tr., p.21.)
Based on a consideration of all the relevant information, defense counsel
recommended the district court impose a unified sentence of seven to eight years, with
two years fixed, suspended for a period of probation. (Sentencing Tr., p.71.) Although
it acknowledged the presence of the mitigating factors, the district court rejected that
recommendation, instead, imposing and executing a unified sentence of nineteen years,
with four years fixed. (Sentencing Tr., p.82; R., pp.96-97.)
Within fourteen days of the judgment of conviction, Mr. Savage filed a motion
pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) requesting the district court reconsider that
decision. (R., p.101.) The district court held a hearing on that motion, at which time
defense counsel explained additional information about the prospects for Mr. Savage’s
rehabilitation while in custody had come to light. (Rule 35 Tr., p.19, Ls.4-7.) It had
become clear that not only had Mr. Savage not been assigned a program pathway, he
would not be considered for evaluation in that regard at the Receiving and Diagnostics
Unit (RDU) until he was within four to six months of his parole eligibility date.
(Defendant’s Rule 35 Exhibit A, pp.1-3.) Furthermore, Mr. Savage was told he would
remain in county jail until space became available at the RDU. (Defendant’s Rule 35
Exhibit A, p.2.) He was also unable to participate in the minimal programming available
in the county jail (faith groups and Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings) because he
was being housed with a group of gang members, which meant, to avoid associating
with, or having confrontations with, them, he had to isolate himself. (Rule 35 Tr., p.24,
L.24 - p.25, L.16.)
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As such, defense counsel asked the district court to reduce Mr. Savage’s
sentence so as to make him immediately parole eligible, and/or consider retaining
jurisdiction so Mr. Savage could get timely access to rehabilitation programs. (Rule 35
Tr., p.33, Ls.7-22.) While the district court rejected that request, it acknowledged it had
exceeded the State’s recommendation in the indeterminate term of the sentence by one
year, and so, it decided to reduce the indeterminate portion of Mr. Savage’s sentence
by one year. (Rule 35 Tr., p.54, Ls.4-21.)
Before the amended judgment of conviction was filed, Mr. Savage filed a notice
of appeal. (R., pp.106-08, 113-14.)
ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it initially imposed and
executed Mr. Savage’s sentence.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it refused to further reduce
Mr. Savage’s sentence pursuant to his Rule 35 motion.
ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Initially Imposed And Executed
Mr. Savage’s Sentence
Sentences are to be crafted such that they promote the goals, or objectives, of

sentencing: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.

State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).

The protection of

society is the primary objective the court should consider. Id. Therefore, a sentence
that protects society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered
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reasonable. Id.; State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because
the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result,
each must be addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; I.C. § 19-2521.
To that point, the Idaho Supreme Court has also held that rehabilitation “should usually
be the initial consideration in the imposition of the criminal sanction.” State v. McCoy,
94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158
Idaho 103 (2015).
The district court’s initial decision to impose and execute Mr. Savage’s sentences
fails to promote either the primary goal of protection of society or the foremost goal of
rehabilitation. As to the protection of society, Dr. Landers testified that Mr. Savage’s
actions in this case were the product of a very particular set of circumstances, which
gave rise to his adjustment disorder, and so, constituted an isolated course of conduct
unlikely to be repeated. (Sentencing Tr., p.15.) In fact, Mr. Savage was evaluated to be
a low risk for recidivism, “including towards those harmed by his previous actions.
(Defendant’s Sentencing Exhibit A, p.2; PSI, Part 1, p.20.)

Furthermore, since the

external stressor which gave rise to the adjustment disorder (the divorce) is over, that
condition is not a present or future issue. (See, e.g., Sentencing Tr., p.61.) As such, as
Dr. Landers pointed out, regarding the goal of protecting society, “I don’t think that
requires incarceration. I think that can be supervised without incarceration.”
(Sentencing Tr., p.17.)
As to rehabilitation, Dr. Landers testified Mr. Savage’s already-low risk could be
further reduced by providing him treatment and supervision in the community.
(Sentencing Tr., p.16.)

That treatment would necessarily focus on the other factor
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which contributed to the events in this case:
Defendant’s Sentencing Exhibit A, p.2.)

Mr. Savage’s alcoholism.

(See

Dr. Landers explained that the necessary

treatment was widely available in the community, such that “there’s no service in jail that
wouldn’t be provided in the community or couldn’t be provided in the community.”
(Sentencing Tr., pp.17, 21.) He added that even the federal prisons, which are the best
funded institutions, do not provide a lot of the necessary treatment in these situations.
(Sentencing Tr., p.21.) As such, Dr. Landers explained: “it is unlikely that time served
in and of itself will create the adaptive coping skills and insight necessary to become a
productive member of society with a recognition of and investment in social norms,
ethics, and moral behavior once returned to the community.” (Defendant’s Sentencing
Exhibit A, p.4.)
However, Dr. Landers did not just make that assertion; he also explained why
programming in prison is insufficient to adequately address the issues in Mr. Savage’s
case: “one of the problems by treating that [drug and alcohol use] in an incarcerated or
inpatient setting is, you don’t really expose the person to the triggers that are going to
trigger the disorder.” (Sentencing Tr., p.22.) Rather, “[t]reatment is in the form of living
day to day according to societal norms and being exposed to the demands of society.
You don’t get that in prison.” (Sentencing Tr., p.21.) This is particularly problematic
because, as the Legislature has instructed, when the need of correctional treatment is
not “provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution,” the sentencing court
should be more inclined to not incarcerate the defendant.

I.C. § 19-2521(1)(b)

(emphasis added). Therefore, the decision to execute Mr. Savage’s sentences is even
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more problematic because, besides failing to serve the primary goal of protecting
society, it fails to serve the foremost goal of rehabilitation.
The abuse of the district court’s discretion is also evident when the instructions
the Legislature gave to sentencing courts in the controlling statutes are considered:
“The court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime without imposing
sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the
crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that
imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the public . . . .”
(emphasis added).

I.C. § 19-2521(1)

Therefore, even if the nature of the crime itself might favor

incarceration (see I.C. § 19-2521(1)(c)-(e), (2)(a)-(e)), the sentencing court still has to
consider that in light of the defendant’s character. See also State v. Miller, 151 Idaho
828, 835 (2011) (reiterating this point).
Mr. Savage’s character shows incarceration is inappropriate in this case. As
Dr. Landers testified, there is no undue risk he will commit another crime while on
probation. See I.C. §§ 19-2521(1)(a), (2)(i). Rather, these actions were “the result of
circumstances unlikely to recur.”

See I.C. § 19-2521(2)(h).

As the PSI reveals,

Mr. Savage has no criminal record beside those relating to this particular set of events.
I.C. §§ 19-2521(1)(f), (2)(g). The record also shows, pursuant to a civil judgment, which
appears to incorporate the restitution order in this case (see Rule 35 Transcript,
p.14, Ls.11-23), Mr. Savage has agreed to compensate the victims in this case.
I.C. § 19-2521(2)(f).

As such, a consideration of all the relevant factors reveals a

suspended sentence would best serve all the sentencing objectives. The district court’s
rejection of that sentencing alternative, therefore, constitutes an abuse of its discretion.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Refused To Further Reduce
Mr. Savage’s Sentence Pursuant To His Rule 35 Motion
“The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency [in a Rule 35
motion] are the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was
reasonable.” State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). However, a Rule 35
motion needs to be accompanied by new or additional information, which may include
“any other

information

concerning

the

defendant’s

rehabilitative

progress

in

confinement.” State v. Snapp, 113 Idaho 350, 351 (Ct. App. 1987); cf. State Martinez,
154 Idaho 940, 949 (Ct. App. 2013). “It would ill serve the purpose of a Rule 35 motion
to preclude the defendant from presenting fresh information about himself or his
circumstances.” State v. Torres, 107 Idaho 895, 898 (Ct. App. 1984).
To that point, Mr. Savage presented information about his rehabilitative progress
while incarcerated.

That new information proved Dr. Lander’s testimony (that

rehabilitation while incarcerated would be ineffective) to be prophetic. Mr. Savage had
been unable to make progress while incarcerated due to the nature of the minimal
rehabilitative programs available to him. (See generally Defendant’s Rule 35 Exhibit A.)
Because he had not been evaluated for a program pathway, and he was unlikely to
receive such an evaluation for another three and one-half years, the only options for him
were faith groups and AA meetings. (Rule 35 Tr., p.24, L.24 - p.25, L.4; Defendant’s
Rule 35 Exhibit A, pp.2-3.)

Here, it is important to remember that the timing of

rehabilitation is an important consideration in whether that goal is actually being served
by the sentencing determination. See, e.g., State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971);

11

State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App.
2008); State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988).

Thus, the fact that

Mr. Savage will not have a meaningful opportunity to get into a prison program6 for
several years, particularly when such treatment is available under other sentencing
alternatives, means the district court’s decision to not further reduce his sentence to
make him immediately eligible for parole does not most effectively serve the goals of
sentencing as required by statute. See I.C. 19-2521(1)(b).
As a result, the district court’s decision to reject Mr. Savage’s request for leniency
was an abuse of discretion regardless of the fact that it shaved one year off his nearly
two-decade long sentence because it failed to ensure the sentence was serving all the
goals of sentencing. See I.C. § 19-2521; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; Toohill, 103
Idaho at 568. The sentence as amended still does not promote protection of society
because Mr. Savage does not present a risk to society.

Additionally, the new

information affirmatively demonstrates the sentence as amended is not serving the goal
of rehabilitation. Therefore, this Court should grant relief in this case.

Even if Mr. Savage were to get into a prison program, there is still the issue
highlighted by Dr. Landers: prison rehabilitation programs are less likely to be effective
in providing effective treatment. (Defendant’s Sentencing Exhibit A, pp.2-4; Sentencing
Tr., pp.21-22, 25-26.)

6
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Savage respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court
for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 10th day of March, 2016.

___________/s/______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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